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RECENT CASES
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ORER
REQUIRING COMPLIANCE WITH THE Excelsior RULE HELD ENFORCEABLE ALTHOUGH RULE NOT ADOPTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE MAKING PROVISIONS
OF THE ADmINISTRATIVE PRocEDuRE ACT

On petition of the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers, AFL-CIO' the National Labor
Relations Board 2 ordered an election among certain employees of the WymanGordon Company 4 to determine their exclusive bargaining representative. The
employees were given the choice between the Brotherhood, a competing union
(the United Steelworkers of America), or no union at all. Pursuant to its
responsibility to ensure a fair election,6 the Board, relying on its rule announced
in Excelsior Underwear, Inc.,6 ordered the Company to furnish a list of names
and addresses of its employees eligible to vote in the election. The list was to
be made available to the unions for election purposes. The Company refused
to furnish the list, contending that the rule requiring it was not adopted in
accordance with procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act 7 specifically
regulating rule making 8 Upon this refusal, the Board issued a subpoena duces
tecum ordering the Company to supply the list. The Company did not comply
with the subpoena. The Board then filed an action in the Massachusetts district
court seeking to have its subpoena enforced, or, in the alternative, seeking a
mandatory injunction compelling the Company to comply with its order. The
district court ordered enforcement, finding the rule making and adjudicatory
requirements of the APA not applicable to the Excelsior rule adoption. 10 The
court of appeals reversed, holding that the Board's order was unenforceable
because it was based on a rule that had not been adopted in accordance with
1. Hereinafter referred to as the Brotherhood.
2. Hereinafter referred to as the Board.
3. Pursuant to the Board's power under the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 159 (1964).
4. Hereinafter referred to as the Company.
5. Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1964).
6. 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966). In the Excelsior decision, the Board decided to establish
"a requirement that will be applied in all, election cases. That is, within 7 days after the
Regional Director has approved a consent-election entered into by the parties . . . or after
the Regional Director or the Board has directed an election ... the employer must file with
the Regional Director an election-eligibility list, containing the names and addresses of all
the eligible voters. The Regional Director, in turn, shall make this information available to
all parties in the case. Failure to comply with this requirement shall be grounds for setting
aside the election whenever proper objections are filed." Id. at 123940 (emphasis added).
The Board declined to apply its new rule to the companies involved in the Excelsior
case. Instead, it held that the rule would apply "only in those elections that are directed,
or consented to, subsequent to 30 days after the date of [the] decision." Id. at 1240, n.5.
7. 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (Supp. 1I1, 1968). (hereinafter cited as the APA).
8. Id. § 553.
9. N.L.R.B. v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 270 F. Supp. 280 (D. Mass. 1967).
10. Id. at 284.
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the rule making requirements of the APA.11 On certiorari, the Supreme Court
of the United States again reversed. Held, although the Board did not comply
with the required rule making procedures of the APA in adopting the rule
requiring a list of names and addresses of the employees, the Board's specific
direction to the employer compelling him to furnish the list in the instant
adjudicatory proceeding was nevertheless valid, and was enforceable by a district court order requiring compliance with the Board's subpoena. National
Labor Relations Board v. Wyman-Gordon Company, 394 U.S. 759 (1969).

Administrative agencies formulate substantive policies,1 2 and these policies
are implemented by "rules"' 3 promulgated by the agency. The APA provides
for this policy implementation either by invoking special rule making procedures
or by administrative adjudication. 14 Once the decision to proceed by the special
rule making provisions or by adjudication is made, the APA mandates distinct
and specific procedural requirements for each. The special rule making procedure requires publication of notice of intended rule making, an opportunity for
interested persons to participate, publication of the rules, and deferred effectiveness of the newly adopted rules. 1 The adjudicatory proceeding provides for
notice of the issues, responsive pleadings, an opportunity to submit evidence
before a hearing officer, and a decision substantiated by facts.' 0 The APA fails7
to indicate, however, under what circumstances each process should be used.1
11. Wyman-Gordon Co. v. N.L.R.B., 397 F.2d 394 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. granted, 393
U.S. 932 (1968).
12. The Supreme Court has expounded the underlying rationale for this fact: "Delegation by Congress has long been recognized as necessary in order that the exertion of
legislative power does not become a futility." Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins,
310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940). Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, a leading administrative law
authority, points out, however, that because judicial opinions are characteristically filled
with unrealistic verbiage, and because many lawyers tend to take this verbiage seriously,
controversy as to this fact may still remain. K. DAvis, AixisAnvw LAW 29 (1960). For
an example of this latter viewpoint see Petro, Expertise, The NLRB, and the Constitution.Things Abused and Things Forgotten, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 1126 (1968).
13. The term "rule" in the administrative law context may have at least two meanings. It may refer to that specific policy formulation required to be promulgated in accordance with the procedures set forth in § 553 of the APA, or it may refer to a policy
formulation the effect of which is simply that of a rule of law as would be announced in
a court opinion. Instant case at 769, n.1.
14. The APA provides:
§ 551. Definitions
i4)"'rule' means the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy...
(5) 'rule making' means agency process for formulating, amending, or repealing
a rule;
(6) 'order' means the whole or a part of a final disposition, whether affirmative,
negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other
than rule making ...

(7) 'adjudication' means agency process for the formulation of an order ....
15. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (Supp. III, 1968).
16. Id. § 554.
17. See generally NJ..R.B. v. A.P.W. Products Co., 316 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1963);
FitzGerald, Trends in Federal Administrative Procedure, 19 S.WL.J. 239, 266-72 (1965);
Shapiro, The Choice of Rule Making or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative
Policy, 78 H]Av. L. REy. 921 (1965).
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The definitional distinction between rule making and adjudication s is of no
practical value in this regard, since the statutory definitions of rule making and
adjudication overlap.' 9 Further, the legislative history of the APA is of minimal
assistance in determining when each process should be implemented. Although
the history indicates that a careful distinction between rule making and adjudication was intended, 20 no clear standards for practical application of this distinction were provided. However, two rather vague standards for the employment of the rule making procedure are mentioned: these procedures are to be
implemented when the agency seeks to prescribe a course of conduct for the
future (rather than merely pronounce existing rights or liabilities) ,21 and also
when the agency acts as a quasi-legislature. Adjudicatory procedures, on the
22
other hand, are to be used when the agency acts in its quasi-judicial capacity
Judicial precedent likewise offers limited guidance.23 The leading case, SEC
v. Chenery Corp.,2 4 leaves to agency discretion the means by which to proceed.
Chenery expressly states that "the choice made between proceeding by general
rule or by individual ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed
discretion of the administrative agency." 25 Up to the present, no attempt has
18. See note 14 supra.
19. The area of overlap may be rather broad. For example, adjudication involves the
"particular applicability" of a law which § 551(4) of the APA also classifies as a characteristic of a "rule." Moreover, adjudication, by virtue of the precedential value of a decision,
carries with it some "future effect," also characteristic of rule making by virtue of § 551(4).
Address by Professor Merton C. Bernstein at the meeting of the American Bar Association's
Section of Labor Relations Law on August 11, 1969 in BNA 71 LRR 585, 606 (1969) ; see
N.L.R.B. v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. at 770-71 (1969); Comment, A Judicial Demand
for Utilization of Substantive Rule Making by the NLRB: Wyman-Gordon Co. v. N.L.R.B.,
15 WAYNn L. Rav. 763, 767 (1969).
20. S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 1392-419 (1941). See also S. Rep. No. 752, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. 30-31 (1945).
21. Administrative Procedure Act-Legislative History, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess., 14, 197, 254 (1946). See also 1 K. DAvis, A
rnmms- LAW TR Ar.sE, § 5.02
(1958); Ginnane, "Rule Making," "Adjudication" and Exemptions under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 621, 630-32 (1947); Note, The Federal Administrative
Procedure Act: Codification or Reform?, 56 YALE L.J. 670, 679-83 (1947).
22. Commenting on the statutory definitions, Rep. Walker, one of the sponsors of the
bill, stated: "[Wie speak of rule or rule making whenever agencies are exercising legislative
powers. We speak of orders and adjudications when they are doing things which courts
otherwise do." 92 CoNo. REc. 5649 (1946) (Leg. Hist. of the APA, 355).
Similarly, the House Report asserts: "In stating the essentials of the different forms of
administrative proceedings, the bill carefully distinguishes between so-called legislative functions of administrative agencies (where they issue general regulations) and their judicial
functions (in which they determine rights and liabilities in particular cases). It provides
quite different procedures for the 'legislative' and 'judicial' functions of administrative
agencies. In the 'rule making' (that is 'legislative') function it provides . . . [and] in
'adjudication' (that is, the 'judicial function'). . . ." H. R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess., 17 (Leg. Hist. of the APA, 251) (1946). See also Reich, Ride Making Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, in FEDERAL ADumsTRSinA7v PROCEDURE Acx AND THE ADNasmTRATrJE AGrccs 492-97 (1947).
23. See generally H. FRENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADam sTnRAvE AGENCIES 8-11 (1962);
1 K. DAviS, ADmIaNSTATriv LAW TREATiSE, § 6.13 (Supp. 1965); Peck, The Atrophied
Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729, 753-61
(1961).
24. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
25. Id. at 203; see California v. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., 379 U.S. 366, 371 (1965);
Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 US. 407, 421 (1942).
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been made to define the circumstances under which an agency is free to exercise
its discretion in choosing a method of policy formulation.
The National Labor Relations Board is subject to the requirements of the
APA.26 The Board, in contrast to other administrative agencies which have
willingly employed the rule making procedures of the APA,27 has interpreted
Chenery2 8 as giving it a blank check to make its rules by adjudication. Not
once utilizing the rule making procedures of the APA, it has gone to the extreme
of relying exclusively on adjudication for the formulation of its administrative
rules, and in so doing has obliterated the APA distinction drawn between
"rules" and "orders."211 This practice has evoked extensive criticism from both
the courts3 0 and legal commentators 1 However, in the past, the position
adopted by the reviewing courts has been one of continued permissiveness ac32
companied by numerous unheeded reprimands.
The controversy concerning the Board's rule making procedure has currently focused on the rule issued in Excelsior Underwear,Inc.88 The substantive
validity of the Excelsior rule has been continuously upheld, 84 but the courts
have been divided on the procedural validity of its adoption. Before the Supreme
26. Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 156 et seq. (1964).
27. E.g., Fuchs, Agency Development of Policy Through Rule Making, 59 Nw. UL.
Rav. 781 (1965) (discusses the FCC and FPC); Notes, The Federal Regulatory Agencies:
A Need for Rules of Decision, 50 VA. L. REy. 652 (1964) (discusses the FCC, ICC, and
FPC).
28. The authority of an agency to make rules and standards on a case-by-case basis
established in Chenery was applied to the Board in Optical Workers' Local 24859 v.
N.L.R.B., 227 F.2d 687, 691 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 963 (1956): "We hold
in accordance with the Chenery case ... that the Board has authority to adopt and reverse
policy, either in the form of an individual decision or as rule-making for the future, in any
manner reasonably calculated to carry out its statutory duties, without regard to whether
such action strictly conforms to the rules applicable to courts or legislative bodies."
29. See note 14 supra. The language used by the Board clearly indicates that it intends
its adjudicatory decisions to have more than mere precedential effect. In Excelsior, for
example, the Board openly referred to its decision as a "rule" and said that "We now
establish a requirement that will be applied in all election cases." 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
Similarly, in Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429 (1953), the Board said that
"we now establish an election rule which will be applied in all election cases."
30. E.g., N.L.R.B. v. Penn Cork & Closures, Inc., 376 F.2d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1967), ccrt.
denied sub nom. District Lodge No. 15 v. N.L.R.B., 389 U.S. 843 (1967); N.L.R.B. v.
Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1966); N.L.R.B. v. A.P.W. Products Co.,
316 F.2d 899, 905 (2d Cir. 1963).
31. E.g., 1 K. DAvis, ADimusRaAasVa LAW TRAnsE, § 6.13 (Supp. 1965); H.
FRIENDLY, THE FEDEAL AD mSRaArv AGENcIEs 141-47 (1962); Peck, A Critique of the
National Labor Relations Board's Performance in Policy Formulation: Adjudication and
Rule-Making, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 254 (1968); Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of
the National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961); Shapiro, The Choice of
Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARv. L. Rv.
921 (1965).
32. Cases cited note 30 supra.
33. 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966). See note 6 supra.
34. "iWt is noteworthy that every court which has passed on the issue has held the
Excelsior rule to be a legitimate exercise of the Board's jurisdiction over representation
proceedings." N.L.R.B. v. Q-T Shoe Mfg. Co., 409 F.2d 1247, 1250 (3d Cir. 1969). E.g.,
Groendyke Transport, Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1969); N.L.R.B. v. Beech-Nut
Life Savers, Inc., 406 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1968); Howell Refining Co. v. N.L.R.B., 400
F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1968); British Auto Parts, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 405 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir.
1968); N.L.R.B. v. Hanes Hosiery Div.-Hanes Corp., 384 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1967).
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Court decision in the instant case, four circuit courts 35 had rejected the argument accepted by the first circuit in Wyman-Gordon,8 6 typically concluding that
"[t]he Board can resolve a problem... either by quasi-legislative promulgation
of general rules designed to meet the problem ...or in quasi-judicial proceedings when the problem arises as an issue in a case before the Board .... The
procedure it chooses to follow in resolving any particular problem is a matter
87
for the Board, in its informed judgment, to decide."1
The Supreme'Court granted certiorari to resolve this conflict among the
circuits. 88 The Court, however, fell into conflict itself as to the proper grounds
for decision.80 Mr. Justice Fortas, writing for the plurality, while agreeing with

the court of appeals that the rule making provisions of the APA "may not be
avoided by the process of making rules in the course of adjudicatory proceedings," 40 nevertheless reversed. 41 He maintained that since the Company itself
was specifically directed by the Board to submit a list of the names and addresses of its employees as part of an unquestionably valid order directing that
42
an election be held, the Company should be required to obey the direction.
The Court noted that absent the order directing the election, the Company "was
under no compulsion to furnish the list because no statute and no validly
adopted rule required it to do so."143 In pointing out that the APA requires the
Board to use its rule making procedures, the Court indicated that general rules
for future application formulated in the course of adjudicatory proceedings are
not enforceable 44 without a subsequent adjudicatory order. Taking another
35. The Second, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits all expressed approval of the procedure by which the Excelsior rule was adopted. N.L.R.B. v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc.,
406 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1968); N.L.R.B. v. Q-T Shoe Mfg. Co., 409 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir.
1969); Howell Refining Co. v. N.L.R.B., 400 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1968); Groendyke
Transport, Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1969); British Auto Parts, Inc. v.
N.L.R.B., 405 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1968). Two other circuits approved enforcement of
the Excelsior rule without explicitly passing on the correctness of the method by which it
was adopted. N.L.R.B. v. Hanes Hosiery Div.-Hanes Corp., 384 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1967);
N.L.R.B. v. Rohlen, 385 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1967).
36. See text accompanying notes 8 and 11 supra.
37. N.L.R.B. v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 406 F.2d 253, 257 (2d Cir. 1968).
38. Instant case at 762.

39. There were four separate opinions in the instant case: a plurality opinion (in
which Warren, C.J., Fortas, J., Stewart, J., and White, J. joined) a concurring opinion (in
which Black, J., Brennan, J., and Marshall, J. joined) and two dissenting opinions (Douglas,
J. and Harlan, J.).
40. Instant case at 764.
41. The primary issue and that upon which the reversal rested concerned the validity
of the manner in which the rule was adopted and whether it should be enforced. In a
subsequent portion of the opinion, the Court upheld the substantive validity of the
Excelsior rule. Instant case at 767-69.
42. Instant case at 766. As Mr. Justice Black's concurring opinion points out, the
APA exempts Board certification proceedings from the requirements of the section governing adjudication. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a)(6) (1968). Hence, the hearing and decisional procedures in representation cases are not in strict truth adjudicatory in the APA sense. The
absence of these safeguards in representation cases of the kind involved in Wyman-Gordon
drew no mention in the Court's decision nor in the briefs. Address by Professor Merton C.
Bernstein at the meeting of the American Bar Association's Section of Labor Relations
Law on August 11, 1969 in BNA 71 LRR 585, 603 n.72.
43. Instant case at 766.
44. In this context the Court rebuked the Board for its questionable rule making prac-
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position, Mr. Justice Black in his concurring opinion, differed substantially with
regard to the proper ground for decision. He first criticized the plurality's
"novel theory . . . [of upholding] enforcement of the Excelsior practice in

spite of what it consider[ed] to be statutory violations present in the procedure
by which the requirement was adopted. '45 Then, relying on Chenery's dictate
that "the choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual ad
hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency,"'46 he concluded that "the Excelsior practice was adopted by
the Board as a legitimate incident to the adjudication of a specific case before
it" 47 and consequently "the Board properly followed the procedure applicable
to 'adjudication' rather than 'rule making.' 48 It is implicit in Justice Black's
analysis that the decision in Excelsior was a binding precedent, with the same
effect as a validly adopted rule, which the Company must obey even without
an order specifically directing compliance with it. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting, maintained that the Board in Excelsior chose to make a rule to fit
future cases rather than to perform its adjudicatory function in the conventional
way of treating each case on its special facts. When agencies choose this course,
he "would hold the agencies governed by the rule-making procedure strictly to
its requirements and not allow them to play fast and loose as the National Labor
Relations Board apparently likes to do." 49 Mr. Justice Harlan, also dissenting,
contended that due to the future effect of the Excelsior rule "it clearly [fell]
within the rule-making requirements of the [Administrative Procedure] Act"50
and "[g]iven the fact that the Labor Board ha[d] promulgated a rule in violation of the governing statute ..

.

there [was] no alternative but to affirm the

judgment of the Court of Appeals in the case."' ' He further maintained that he
would at least remand the case for the Board's determination as to whether it
would reach the same result in the instant case without relying on the invalidly
52
adopted rule.
"To put it mildly, the reasoning of Wyman-Gordon lacks clarity if not
intelligibility."m Whether it will prove to be just another in a line of judicial
reprimands distinguished only by the fact that it emanates from the highest
tice saying: "The rule-making provisions of that Act [the APA], which the Board would
avoid, were designed to assure fairness and mature consideration of rules of general application .

. .

. There is no warrant in law for the Board to replace the statutory scheme

with a rule-making procedure of its own invention." Instant case at 764.
45. Id. at 769.
46.

Instant case at 772, quoting SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).

47. Instant case at 770.
48. Id.
49.

Id. at 779.

50. Id. at 780.
51. Id. at 781.
52. The plurality rebutted this argument saying that "[t]o remand would be an idle
and useless formality . . . . There is not the slightest uncertainty as to the outcome of a

proceeding before the Board, whether the Board acted through a rule or an order. It would
be meaningless to remand." Id. at 766-67, n.6.
53. Address by Professor Merton C. Bernstein at the meeting of the American Bar
Association's Section of Labor Relations Law on August 11, 1969 in BNA 71 LRR 585,

605.
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court of the land, or will realize its intended effect to make the Board implement the formal rule making provisions of the APA, 54 remains to be seen.
Wyman-Gordon has declared that rule making and adjudication are mutually
exclusive, but the plurality opinion does not provide a sure guide to the factors
that compel the choice of one procedure rather than the other.5 5 The consequence of the decision may result in one of two divergent courses of conduct.
The Court might in the future pierce the "adjudicatory facade" used by the
Board to evade the rule making procedures of the APA by simply requiring that
certain subsequent Board directives of future-general application be adopted
in accordance with the rule-making procedures of the APA. 56 Instances where
adherence to the APA rule-making procedures would be enforced could be
judicially defined in terms of specific substantive areas until Congress chooses
to act.57 Since the holding of the instant case, resting on specific Board directives
for enforcement, is not applicable to non-directive rule58 situations, perhaps the
Court in the future will enforce the rule making procedures of the APA in
areas where non-directive rules predominate. On the other hand, if the instant
case is applied literally, the Court might enforce any adjudicatory order issued
by the Board regardless of the validity of the adoption of the rule on which
the order is based. Such a development would make Wyman-Gordon but
another empty judicial rebuke, since the Board could work its will without rule
making by going through an adjudicatory proceeding.
Predictably, the Board, until coerced, will continue its current practice, 59
for in its judgment the "formal rule-making procedures are . . . too rigid and
inflexible for most of the problems with which it is concerned. '60 That the
54. Instant case at 764.
55. Address by Professor Merton C. Bernstein at the meeting of the American Bar
Association's Section of Labor Relations Law on August 11, 1969 in BNA 71 LRR 585, 608.
56. Id. 585 et seq. Professor Bernstein offers a thorough analysis of this possible
ramification of the instant case.
57. Rather than judicial coercion Professor Bernstein suggests self-regulation by the
Board. Id. at 619-21. He maintains that "we should choose our fate, rather than have it
simply happen to us." Id. at 621.
58. A non-directive rule achieves Board policy without the necessity of a specific
command, request, or order to a party. The Board's contract bar rule, Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., 21 N.L.R.B. 995 (1958), followed in General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123
(1962), is an example of such a rule. Under this rule, when an established collective bargaining agreement exists, this agreement bars an election petitioned for by a rival union seeking
to represent the employees. Such a non-directive rule is to be contrasted with directive
rules such as the Excelsior rule, which specifically directs certain conduct of a party, i.e.,
the furnishing of eligibility lists.
59. NLRB Solicitor William Feldsman has recently said:
As I read Wyman-Gordon, there is nothing in the plurality opinion or the
dissents to warrant the conclusion that the Court has mapped out subject matter
sectors, even those having far reaching significance, in which the Board, irrespective
Unless the law
of any other factor must engage in substantive rule making ....
will now compel large-scale substantive rule-making, or voluntary experience with
such procedures will teach that very extensive use of them is desirable, neither
of which events I think will occur, adjudication will remain as the Board's staple.
Wyman-Gordon: Rule-Making v. Adjudication, BNA 71 LRR 622-23.
60. Brief for Appellant at 15, N.L.R.B. v. Wyman Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 789 (1969).
The brief continued:
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Board might so easily evade the APA is not necessarily a criticism of the Court.
It had few alternatives. The Court could have decided, as Justice Douglas did,
to enforce only rules adopted in accordance with the APA's rule making provisions. By so holding, the Court would never enforce adjudicatory orders based
on rules adopted in avoidance of the APA rule making procedures. However,
such a decision could easily be circumvented by the Board by merely issuing
subpoenas based on section 11 of the National Labor Relations Act 1 which
confers authority on the Board to compel the production of evidence as part of
its general investigative power. The effect of such a practice would be that
the Board could often evade the APA's rule making procedures and yet coerce
the regulated industry into compliance. As another alternative, the Court could
have based its judgment on Chenery as did the minority. Although this alternative would have been tantamount to allowing the Board to continue its present
practice without even a reprimand it would have also emphasized the real
problem-the APA itself. The statute does not indicate under what circumstances each procedure is to be used. Hence, the courts are really without
standards to determine which procedure is to be employed in a given set of
circumstances. This fact appears to be the reason for Wyman-Gordon's failure
to provide guidelines for the choice of procedure. Congress should decide under
what circumstances each is to be employed. However, any such definitive solution
is practically impossible, due to the overlapping nature of rule making and
adjudicatory functions on the one hand, and the many variables demanding
As the Board has explained, in such complex areas, for example, as secondary
boycotts, picketing, duty to bargain in good faith, and restraint of employees in
the exercise of their Section 7 rights, regulation is ordinarily better accomplished
through case-by-case adjudication, which permits 'gradual development of the law
through specific factual patterns . . . [that] emerge from actual industrial
experience;' also, the cumbersome process of amending formal rules would impede 'the law's ability to respond quickly and accurately to changing industrial
practices.'
The above passage was accompanied by the following footnote:
Supplemental Memorandum of the National Labor Relations Board to the Senate
Judiciary Committee, October 21, 1968, 69 LRRM 159. See also McCulloch, Procedures Employed by NLRB in Determining Policy, Speech to the Administrative
Law Section of the American Bar Association, August 11, 1964, 56 LRRM 31. Cf.
Administrative Procedures in Government Agencies, Final Report of the Attorney
General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess., p. 98, n.18.
61. Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1964). Section 11 could be
implemented as a means of circumventing the rule making procedures only in those situations where the production of evidence is involved. In a situation where production of
evidence is not at issue this method is unavailable to the Board. An example of this latter
situation might be an instance in which the Board seeks to enforce its adjudicatory rule
promulgated in Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953) (employers and unions are
prohibited from making election speeches on company time to massed assemblies of employees within 24 hours before the scheduled time for conducting an election). Suppose a
union claims that the employer violated the Peerless rule and, therefore, the election should
be set aside. The employer might defend by arguing that the rule was not adopted in
accordance with the rule making procedures of the APA, and, therefore, the election cannot
be set aside because of its breach. In this case the Board cannot rely on its independent
subpoena power to set aside the election, since the production of evidence is not at issue. The
Douglas opinion may have teeth in such areas.
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flexibility that operate within specific agencies on the other. Perhaps the solution to the courts' dilemma lies not in an enumeration of circumstances in which
each procedure should be employed, but rather in a legislatively adopted procedure similar to the hybrid rule making-adjudicatory procedure used by the
Board in Excelsior. Such a procedure could incorporate an opportunity for all
interested parties to be heard through amicus briefs, for notice and publication
features, deferred effectiveness of rules, and any other due process requirements
determined essential by Congress. Perhaps the Board in Excelsior, recognizing
that its function was best served by the hybrid procedure, was acting in good
faith. As long as the Board continues to act in good faith, maybe it'62should be
allowed, in Justice Douglas' words, "to have its cake and eat it too."
FRANx

A.

VALENTI

CIVIL RIGHTS-PuBLIC AcCOMMODATIONS-REcREATIONAL
A COVEPED ESTABLISHMENT UNDER 1964 ACT

FACILITY

HELD

The petitioners, Negro residents of Arkansas, brought a class action seeking injunctive relief 1 under the public accommodation section of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,2 to restrain the respondent, owner and operator of the Lake Nixon
62. Instant case at 776.
1. Contrary to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, where civil damages were available, the
only remedy provided in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is injunctive relief. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a
3 (1964).
2. The relevant provisions of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000
et seq. (1964) are as follows:
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1964). All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without
discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1964). Each of the following establishments which serves the
public is a place of public accommodation within the meaning of this title if its
operations affect commerce...
(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other
facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises . . . ;
(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or
other place of exhibition or entertainment; and
(4) any establishment (A) . .. (ii) within the premises of which is physically
located any such covered establishment, and (B) which holds itself out as serving
patrons of such covered establishment.
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c) (1964). The operations of an establishment affect commerce
within the meaning of this title if . . . (2) in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (2) of subsection (b), it serves or offers to serve interstate
travelers or a substantial portion of the food which it serves . . . has moved in
commerce; (3) in the case of an establshment described in paragraph (3) of
subsection (b), it customarily presents films, performances, athletic teams,
exhibitions, or other sources of entertainment which move in commerce; and
(4) in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (4) of subsection (b)
... there is physically located within its premises, an establishment the operations
of which affect commerce within the meaning of this subsection. For purposes
of this section, 'commerce' means travel, trade, traffic, commerce, transportation,
or communication among the several states ....
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